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Abstract 
The rationale of the study is to observe the influence of corporate governance measures and leverage on the non-
financial firms profitability. Panel econometric method ordinary least squares used to examine the impact of 
capital structure and corporate governance measures on the profitability of non-financial companies regularly 
traded on the Karachi Stock Exchange Pakistan for the period of 2008-2012. Empirical results for capital 
structure explored negative relation with return on assets. This inverse association between leverage and firm 
profitability shows that agency problem may lead the companies to use excessive than suitable levels of external 
debt in capital structure. Moreover, results for the ownership concentration and board size are statistically 
significant and directly related to firm profitability while, CEO duality is also significant but inversely associated 
to firm profitability. Possibly this may be the first research study on this issue by using the most recent data set 
non-financial firms from Pakistan.  
Keywords: Corporate governance measures, Capital structure, Firm profitability, Karachi Stock Exchange, Non-
financial firms. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Capital structure and its relationship with firm profitability is a hot issue in literature at finance since the 
publication of Modigliani and Miller (1958). According to them, by assuming perfect market which is free of tax 
and any friction cost the choice of equity or debt does not matter in such environment. The seminal paper of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) elucidated the agency problem in the organization and related outlay. To condense 
the agency outlay there is call for some systematic controls. Although various alternative capital structure 
theories have been developed during the last 50 years so as to determine the appropriate level of capital structure 
and its impact on firm profitability, they differ in their relative emphasis. For instance, while trade-off theory 
suggests an optimum debt level or target level in terms of balance between tax savings and bankruptcy cost, 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) assumes hierarchy of financial decisions under 
which firm resort to external financing only in absence of internal financing. Similarly agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976) talks about agency costs which arise on account of conflict between managers and 
shareholders. In emerging nations, the Substance of governance differs from the developed nations in one 
significant aspect. In the advanced economies, the firms are run by impartially independent executives who have 
little or no ownership in the firm. In contrast in developing economies firms are run by the executives of the 
company who are also controlling shareholders. They treat directors as workers of the family controlling the firm 
rather than the company. In advanced economies the governance emphasis on executive directors whereas in the 
emerging nations the ownership structure is mainly focused. Now a day’s more and more investors in Pakistan 
are becoming aware of the Significance of taking corporate governance measures into account when making 
investment decisions.  
Managers of a firm serving in a competitive market could be forced to take on capital structure choices 
those are consistent with the shareholder's assets maximization objectives. If they are not capable to meet up this 
goal, they possibly will undergo the risk of being detached from their jobs. Literature of corporate governance 
intends to identify a system that supports the performance of management. So for as the performance of the firms 
is concerned the capital structure has significant impact on it and different authors analyzed the association 
between the leverage and profitability and found different outcomes that vary because of different methodologies 
used and also because the different proxies involved in analysis. There exists a tradeoff between risk and return 
of a firm causing from capital structure. With an increased level of leverage, chances of magnification of earning 
per share increases, at the same time chances of not being able to meet fixed financial obligations against debt 
also increases, this concept is known as Trade off Model. Capital structure of a firm has close relationship with 
EPS. Managers of a firm are forced to take actions that are reasonably consistent with shareholder's wealth 
maximization objective. If they depart from this goal as argued by Brigham (1995) they run the risk of being 
removed from their job. Some researchers have explored this topic and found different results about this 
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relationship.  
 
 
Literature Review 
• Capital Structure And Firm Profitability  
The issue of capital structure and its association with firm profitability has been a debated issue in corporate 
finance literature ever since the publication of the important paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Modigliani-
Miller (MM) propagated that in a perfect capital market free of taxes, transaction costs and other frictions, 
capital structure is irrelevant in determining firm value. They showed that the choice between debt and equity 
financing has no material effect on the firm value. This led to a plethora of research on the topic (both theoretical 
and empirical) with researchers examining the robustness of the MM model in the light of realistic assumptions 
relating to market frictions and the information asymmetries. Trade-off theory suggests an optimum debt level or 
target level in terms of balance between tax savings and bankruptcy cost, pecking order theory (Myers and 
Majluf, 1984; Myers, 1984) assumes hierarchy of financial decisions under which firm resort to external 
financing only in absence of internal financing. Similarly agency theory of debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) 
talks about agency costs which arise on account of conflict between managers and shareholders. Jenson (1986) 
had a view that increase in leverage is a signal or commitment for the improvement in the performance. Asem 
and Sherridane (1997) analyzed the operating performance of the firms that increased their leverage. 
Wiwattanakantang (1999) documented negative association between leverage and return on assets. The study 
further suggested that high level of debt will decrease performance of the firm. Ebaid (2009) explored that 
capital structure choices have a weak to-no impact on company performance. Sami et al (2011) found the 
negative association between the above said relationships. Salim and Yadav (2012) used three ways to measure 
capital structure, Short term, long term and total debt as explanatory variable. When return on assets is used as a 
performance measure the results for all of the three measures of independent variable have negative relationship 
with firm performance.  
 
Corporate Governance Measures and Firm Profitability 
The relationship between corporate governance and profitability of the firm has also been debated due to its 
importance. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) showed that good corporate governance is positively and significantly 
associated to firm profitability. Mashayekhi & Bazazb (2008) reported that number of directors on the board is 
inversely related to firm profitability while board independence is positively related to firm performance. Sami, 
Wang and Zhou (2011) documented that composite measure of corporate governance is significant and 
positively related to firm performance. Yasser (2011) argued that firm having better corporate governance are 
more profitable and pay more dividends to their shareholders as compared to poorly or moderate governed firm. 
Latif et al (2013) explored that corporate governance have significant impact on firm performance. Results 
further explains that board size, CEO role duality have significant impact on return on assets, while board 
composition have insignificant influence on return on assets. 
• Board size and profitability 
Eisenberg et al (1998) reported that for small and midsize firms the relationship is negatively correlated. Cheng 
(2008) provided empirical evidence on the less variability in firm performance due to larger boards and reported 
negative association between board size and firm performance. Cheng also suggested the reason for less 
variability in corporate performance that larger board’s needs consensus so that decisions are less extreme. 
O’Connell and Cramer (2010) found that board size is less significant and inversely related to firm performance 
for smaller firms, while there is a significant and positive relationship between board independence and firm 
performance. Uchida (2011) reported that there is no evidence of performance improvement for firms that 
downsized boards.  
• Board independence and firm profitability 
Usually independence of the board is judged from the outside directors’ number on the board. Due to their 
independence from the management outside directors are desirable. Researches explores that whenever large 
numbers of independent directors are presented on the board there will be an effective monitoring of actions of 
the management and governance. Bhagat and Black (2002) reported no correlation between Independent 
members on the board and Firm Performance in the long-term. Arosa at el (2010) found that existence of 
independent outside directors on the board is positively related to firm performance specifically mentioning that 
firm is run by first generation. Pombo and Gutierrez (2011) reported positive relationship between both variables 
relationship with return on assets. While Francis et al (2012) showed no significant effect of board independence 
on firm performance.  
• CEO duality and firm profitability 
CEO is the chief executive of the company has managerial responsibilities whereas chairman has responsibilities 
concerning the supervision of board’s matter of the firm. Boyd (1995) whenever there is CEO role duality, it 
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Increases the locus of control, Discretion of CEO. Baliga et al (1996) explored that market is unresponsive to the 
change in company’s duality status and change in performance of the firm. Chen et al (2005) found inverse 
relationship between CEO role duality and performance. While Guillet et al (2013) documented that CEO role 
duality improves performance of the restaurant industry.  
 
• Managerial ownership and firm profitability 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first to present the ownership and management separation problem. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) examined the insider ownership effect on firm profitability. McConnell and Servaes (1990) 
explored a strong association between managerial ownership and firm performance direction was negative. Cui 
and Mak (2002) documented W-shaped association between insider’s ownership and firm profitability. Firm 
performance initially declines with insider ownership, then rises, then declines again and, finally, rises again. 
Miguel, Pindado and La Torre (2004) reported a significant but inverse association between managerial 
ownership and companies’ profitability.  
• Ownership concentration and firm profitability 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) reported that outside ownership influence firm performance. Mehran (1995) 
documented no significant association between block holders shareholding and firm profitability. Miguel, 
Pindado and La Torre (2004) suggested that there is significant association between ownership concentration and 
firm profitability. Chen et al (2005) identified no positive association between ownership concentration and firm 
performance. Thomsen et al (2006) found insignificant relationship between ownership concentration and firm 
profitability. Single equation researches are inclined to find a weak positive relationship between owner control 
and accounting profitability of a firm (Berle and Means, 1932; short, 1994). Arosa at el (2010) reported that in 
first generation larger concentrated ownership may take monitoring and expropriation hypothesis in to 
consideration. Second generation may bring larger spread of ownership. Fazlzadeh, Mahboubi, and Hendi, 
(2011) found no significant association between concentrated ownership and firm profitability. Pathirawasam 
and Wickremasinghe, (2012) determined a positive impact of Ownership Concentration on ROA. 
 
4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research Study is entirely based on secondary data collected of 155 companies for 5 years (2008-12). 
Population for the study is comprised of the non-financial companies listed at Karachi Stock Exchange of 
Pakistan (KSE). Companies are selected on the basis of convenience and availability of data. 
 
4.1. Variables of the study: 
Operational definitions of the variables are given below: 
Table 1: Operational Definition of Variables included in the study 
Variable Name Symbol 
Used 
Operational Definition 
Leverage LEV Calculated as ratio of total debt to total assets 
Board Size BS  Total number of directors on the board  
Board Independence  BI  Ratio of  Number of Outside Directors to total number of Directors  
CEO role duality CD A dummy variable. Takes the value of 1 if there is CEO dulity, 0 
otherwise. 
Managerial 
Ownership  
MNO  Ratio of shares held by CEOs, directors, and their immediate family 
members to total outstanding shares  
Ownership 
Concentration  
OWC  Ratio of Common Shares held by five largest to total outstanding  stocks   
Return on Assets ROA Ratio of net profit before tax to total assets 
 
4.2. Population and sample 
Companies listed as a non-financial firm at Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan (KSE) constitutes the 
population for the study. To select sample from the population as mentioned in above below, the study used 
convenience sampling technique which was based on the availability of the data. 
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Table 2:  Listed Companies at Karachi Stock Exchange 
Total Number of Listed Symbols  800 
(-)     Future contracts 162  
(-)     Stock index future contracts 09  
(-)     Bonds 41  
  (212) 
Total Companies Listed  588 
(-)     Commercial Banks 25  
(-)     Equity Investment firms 39  
(-)     Financial Services 40  
(-)     Life Insurance firms 04  
(-)     Non-Life Insurance firms 29  
  (137) 
Total Non-Financial firms   451 
(Source: Karachi Stock Exchange website) 
 
4.4. Econometrical Models of the Research  
Following research models are tested in this research study: 
4.4.1 Impact of capital structure on firm profitability 
ROAit = β0 + β1 LEVit + ϵit       
4.4.2 Impact of corporate governance measures on firm profitability 
ROAit = β0 + β2 BIit+ β1 BSit +  β3 CDit+ β5 OWCit + β4 MNOit + β6 LEVit + ϵit   
Overall model for the research is presented below.  
Figure 1: Research model      
 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive Analysis  
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 BS  BI CD MNO  OWC LEV ROA 
Mean 7.996 0.625 0.230 0.246 0.658 0.579 0.058 
Standard Deviation. 1.510 0.224 0.421 0.254 0.188 0.214 0.109 
Kurtosis  5.144 0.022 -0.342 -0.476 -0.757 -0.126 5.334 
Skewness 2.110 -0.679 1.288 0.814 -0.215 -0.336 0.617 
Max 15 1.000 1 0.931 0.999 0.980  
Min  6 0.000 0 0.000 0.095 0.002  
Observations 775 775 775 775 775 775 775 
Descriptive statistics about the data is presented in the above table to show the characteristics of the data. 
 
Table 4: Correlation Table 
 BI BS CD LEV MNO OWC ROA 
BI 1.000 0.099 -0.085 0.042 -0.267 0.066 0.022 
BS  1.000 -0.135 0.045 -0.252 -0.024 0.052 
CD   1.000 0.057 0.181 -0.033 -0.150 
LEV    1.000 0.107 -0.070 -0.464 
MNO     1.000 -0.024 -0.080 
OWC      1.000 0.137 
ROA       1.000 
Notes: Pearson correlation coefficient   (**= Significant at 1%, *= significant at 5 %) 
      Capital Structure 
 
Corporate Governance    
Measures 
Firm Profitability 
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Above table don not show any serious concerns about multicollinearity.  
Table 5: Relationship between Capital Structure and firm profitability 
 
     C LEV R-squared Adj. R-square St. Error of Reg F-statistic 
 
ROA 
0.230*** 
(0.016) 
-0.297*** 
(0.027) 
0.642 0.553 0.073 7.171*** 
(* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1%) 
Equation of capital structure and firm profitability relationship in the above table is estimated by choosing ROA 
as dependent variable. The model validity is implied by significant F-statistic and high determination power 
indicated by R-Squared, and adjusted R-squared. Relationship between Leverage and ROA is significant with 
indirect relation, indicating lower ROA in result of high leverage. Determination power (R-squared: 64%, Adj. 
R-squared: 55%) of model and the strength of relation (coefficient: -0.297) both indicated the good statistical 
health of model. Further it is to be stated that capital structure is showing significant relationship (p<0.01). 
 
TABLE 6: Impact of corporate governance measures on firm profitability  
 
 
ROA 
C 0.167* 
(0.096) 
BS   0.007** 
(0.003) 
BI -0.011 
 (0.020) 
CD -0.021* 
 (0.011) 
MNO 0.000 
  (0.022) 
OWC    0.055** 
 (0.026) 
LEV   -0.260*** 
(0.020) 
R-squared 0.197 
Adj. R-square 0.190 
St. Error of Reg 0.073 
F-statistic 26.872*** 
(* significant at 10 %, ** significant at 5 %, *** Significant at 1%) 
The above table tests the relationship between corporate governance measures and firm profitability. Corporate 
governance measures are used as independent variable, while return on assets as dependent variable. Board size 
and ownership concentration are showing significant relationship (p<0.05) with firm profitability while CEO 
duality is significant relationship (p<0.10) with firm profitability. Further it is to be stated that board 
independence and managerial ownership are not showing significant relationship at a level of significance of 10 
%.      
 
6. DISCUSSION 
6.1 Impact of Capital Structure on firm profitability 
Results show that coefficient of leverage is significant and inversely associated to Return on asset. Suggesting 
that high level of leverage will decrease performance of a firm. It means additional level of debt will decrease 
profitability (return on asset). The inverse relationship between leverage and ROA is consistent with the results 
of Sami, Wang and Zhou, (2011), Salim and Yadav (2012).    
 
6.2 Impact of Corporate Governance Measures on firm profitability 
In this regression equation same model is estimated again by regressing ROA as dependent. Results shows that 
the relationship of concentration of ownership and Board size is significant and directly associated to ROA, 
suggesting that larger board size will handle corporate affairs so effectively that in result improve return on 
assets. This result is consistent with the previously held studies like Ehikioya (2009), Adams and Mehran (2012). 
Ownership concentration is also significant and positively associated to ROA. Theis suggests that block holders 
as compared to dispersed owners have much more aptitude to pressurize the management to take effective 
measures to improve performance. This result is consistent with the previously held studies like Ehikioya (2009). 
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CEO Duality is also significant but inversely associated with ROA. The inverse association explicates that if 
duality is there, the performance of the company suffers due to lack of independence. The negative relationship 
between CEO duality and firm profitability is consistent with Omran, Bolbol and Fatheldin (2008). Results of 
proportion of board independence and managerial ownership are statistically insignificant, Proportion of board 
independence with negative sign and managerial ownership with positive sign. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The research is conducted with the main objective to examine the impact of leverage and governance measures 
and on firm profitability. Although important steps have been taken by the Pakistani government for the 
development of corporate governance, but still companies in Pakistan have weak mechanisms of corporate 
governance. A public firm raises money to finance its operations by issuing debt and equity, mix of these 
different sources of capital is referred to capital structure.  Business decisions on capital structure strategy have 
been discussed by literature from a long time but issue is still unresolved. One of the main ideas of modern 
finance presented by Modigliani-Miller (1958) is that, apart from tax considerations it does not matter to a firms 
investors how the firm raises money. In other words, if taxes are ignored, the choice of debt or equity does not 
affect firms’ value. But when corporate taxes are taken in to account then the capital structure choice for the 
firms’ value maximization is excessive leverage, arguments are supported by Modigliani-Miller (1963). Firms’ 
actions in reality show that it is traditional to have some "acceptable" blend of money owing and equity. A lot of 
research work is in progress on capital structure, its determinants and other related aspects but mostly in 
advanced countries. The present study is an effort to make an addition to present the current literature on the 
association linking leverage and firm profitability of Pakistani listed companies. This study will be helpful for 
managers for financial decision making related to capital structure formation in underdeveloped economies. For 
Capital structure and firm profitability this research study found an inverse relationship.  
Corporate governance is on its starting phase in Pakistan. No punishment for malpractices and 
unethical practices led the economy towards weak corporate governance system.  In reality many firms are not 
completely practicing the code of corporate governance. Although important steps have been taken by the 
Pakistani government in the country for the development of corporate governance, but still companies in 
Pakistan in contrast with the companies in developed countries have weak mechanisms of corporate governance. 
This weak mechanism is also evident from recent corporate scandals in Pakistan, name of some sandals are: Taj 
Company, Crescent Bank Fraud, PTCL privatization, Mehran bank and ENGRO Group of Companies. These 
corporate scandals were the result of mismanagement or more specifically bad governance. The consequences of 
these corporate scandals were borne by all the stakeholders. All parties have direct or indirect interest in 
corporate governance for the effective performance of the firm. Shareholders interest is in their wealth 
maximization, management in their salaries and other benefits, creditors have interest in the sound position of 
company to be able to pay back their money along with returns, state have interest due to proper tax assessment 
and collection. In response these individuals gives value in the form of social, natural, human, and other forms of 
capital. As the study already stated above that corporate governance is at the evolutionary stage in developing 
countries.  
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